We use a panel of 16 OECD countries over several decades to investigate the effects of government debts and deficits on long-term interest rates. In simple static specifications, a one-percentage-point increase in the primary deficit relative to GDP increases contemporaneous long-term interest rates by about 10 basis points. In a vector autoregression (VAR), the same shock leads to a cumulative increase of almost 150 basis points after 10 years. The effect of debt on interest rates is non-linear: only for countries with above-average levels of debt does an increase in debt affect the interest rate.
Introduction
After years of Þscal consolidation in the 1990s, governments of many OECD countries have again embarked on expansionary Þscal policies. In 2003, the US government deÞcit reached 4.5 percent of GDP, compared with 1.5 percent in 2000, and is projected to increase further in the future. Over the same period, Germany's deÞcit rose to 3.75 percent of GDP from 1 percent; France's to 3.5 compared with 1.5, and Italy's to 2.5 from 0.75 percent; as a result, the Stability and Growth Pact has come under strain, possibly weakening the resistance to larger deÞcits in Europe in the future.
One of the main concerns raised by governments' increased Þscal laxity is its effect on long-term interest rates. Undergraduate macroeconomic textbooks teach that budget deÞcits push interest rates up, leading to decreased investment and growth in the long-run. However, many economists and policymakers have argued that more sophisticated theorizing leads to less dire predictions, if not to an outright reversal of the textbook story, or that the quantitative signiÞcance of the effect is likely to be small. 1 Given that theory does not settle the matter (as it rarely does) the focus now is on empirical evidence.
The effects of Þscal imbalances on interest rates have been the subject of an extensive but hiterto inconclusive empirical literature. 2 However, estimates of the impact of debts and deÞcits on interest rates vary widely. 3 Almost all of this work is based on time series evidence from single countries, typically the US. This suggests that there may be signiÞcant beneÞts 1 from bringing cross-country evidence to bear on this question. This is the goal of the present paper.
We examine the effects of Þscal policy on interest rates in a broad panel of 16 OECD countries covering a maximum time span from 1960 to 2002. The results indicate statistically and economically signiÞcant effects of Þscal imbalances on long-term interest rates. In our preferred speciÞcation, a one percentage point increase of the primary deÞcit-to-GDP ratio is associated with a 10-basis-point rise in the nominal interest rate on 10-year government bonds. The increase is larger when one also considers the effect that a positive shock to the primary deÞcit has on expected future Þscal policy and macro variables in the long-run: in a dynamic VAR a one percentage point increase in the primary deÞcit-to-GDP ratio leads to a cumulative increase of almost 150 basis points after 10 years.
In addition to the current deÞcit, it is important to examine the implications of changes in the stock of public debt. We Þnd that the effect is non-linear and that the response of long-term interest rates is positive and statistically signiÞcant only when the stock of public debt is above a given threshold. While in a country with a debt-to GDP ratio of 119 per cent (Italy in 2002) a one-standard-deviation increase in government debt leads to an increase in the nominal interest rate on 10-year government bonds of about 36 basis points, an increase by the same amount where the public debt-to-GDP ratio is 58 percent (the US in 2002) leads to a 5 basis points decrease in the interest rate. 4 We also Þnd that a worsening of public Þnances abroad has an effect on national interest rates, which is evidence that OECD countries' Þnancial markets are to some extent internationally integrated. However, the degree of globalization is far from complete: controlling for the average value of the primary deÞcit and public debt to GDP ratios across OECD countries, a shock to each country's primary balance still affects national long-term interest rates. 5 In a similar vein, we investigate whether the impact of Þscal variables on interest rates is more severe in Þnancially less developed countries, and we Þnd some evidence to this effect.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the econometric technique used in the estimation. Section 3 investigates the relation between 4 Note, however, that the ratio of government debt to GDP has a standard deviation equal to 26 per cent, hence a one-standard-deviation increase in the public debt is quite a substantial change. The response of interest rates to a one percent change of the stock of public debt to GDP ratio would be really minimal, even in countries with extreme low or high values of public debt. 5 Besides incomplete Þnancial-market integration, differential government default risks may also explain this result.
Þscal policy and long-term interest rates in static models, tackles causality, expands the empirical analysis of our benchmark speciÞcations and checks the robustness of the results. Section 4 presents estimates from dynamic VAR models. The last section concludes.
Data and Method
In this section we describe the data we use in the empirical analysis, discuss the choice of the variables of interest, and investigate the time-series properties of the variables. The paper uses yearly data on OECD countries covering a maximum time span from 1960 to 2002. The countries included in the sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Japan, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom, and United States. All Þscal and macroeconomic data are from the OECD Economic Outlook n.73, June 2003. Data on interest rates on 3-month Treasury bills and on 10-year government bonds are from Global Financial Data; data on 10-year interest rates on swap contracts are from Bloomberg. Data on Þnancial development are from the World Bank database on Financial Development and Structure. 6 Since the objective is to isolate the effects of Þscal policy on interest rates, we use a long-term bond rate as the dependent variable. A long-term rate reßects market conditions, including inßationary expectations, in contrast to short-term rates which are heavily inßuenced by current monetary policy. We focus on the nominal interest rate on 10-year government bonds (INT 10Y ) because OECD countries in the sample have been issuing this type of long-term bond for many years and, hence, long time-series of this variable are available. 7 Our key indicators of the Þscal stance refer to the general government and are the primary deÞcit as a share of GDP (P RDEF ) and the public debt as a share of GDP (GDEBT 1 or GDEBT 2). We use the primary deÞcit, rather than the total deÞcit, because it strips out the direct effect of interest rates on expenditure, thus better capturing autonomous changes in Þscal policy. We use two measures of government debt, GDEBT 1 or GDEBT 2, which 6 T h e d a t a b a s e i s a v a i l a b l e o n l i n e a t http://www.worldbank.org/research/projects/Þnstructure/database.htm. 7 The results are robust if, instead, the long-term interest rate series from the OECD, which is an average of the interest rates of long-term bonds of different maturities, is used as the dependent variable. The results also stand up if the spread between the 10-year government bonds interest rate and the 3-month Treasury bills interest rate is taken as the dependent variable, and if both rates are entered in real terms.
3 differ in the way in which the variable is deßated. GDEBT 1 is equal to the stock of public debt measured at the end of period t-1 divided by the level of GDP in year t-1. GDEBT 2 is constructed following the approach in Levine et al (2002) . It is a year-average debt stock (i.e. the average of the stock of public debt in year t-1 and in year t divided by GDP in year t) which insulates the debt ratio from within-year inßation. Relative to other contributions in the literature our speciÞcation is slightly unusual, in that it includes both the deÞcit and the debt. Our reason for doing so is that in theory the relationship between Þscal policy and interest rates may be mediated by either variable. Textbook IS-LM accounts tend to emphasize the deÞcit, while microfounded general equilibrium models tend to place more weight on the stock of debt. Furthermore, even if one were speciÞcally interested in the effects of only one of these variables, it would still make sense to control for the other. For example, given the current stock of debt, including the deÞcit may help controlling for the expected future path of the debt itself. Finally, including both variables will allow us to study interactions among them. For example, some of our speciÞcations are designed to assess whether the effect of deÞcits depends on the level of debt.
To achieve identiÞcation we mainly follow the well-worn path of adding relevant control variables. The chief concern, of course, is to hold monetary policy constant. To this end, in all our speciÞcations we include the nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills (INT 3M) and the inßation rate (INF L). 8 We also control for the GDP growth rate (GROW T H) and for global indicators of world Þscal imbalances. We typically also have a full set of country and year dummies. Finally, we use instrumental variables to allow for the possible endogeneity of Þscal policy associated with the government reaction function.
Time Series Properties and Estimation Technique
The stationarity properties of nominal interest rates (on 10-year government bonds and 3-month Treasury bills), the inßation rate, and the primary balance and public debt as a share of GDP were examined using the unit root test for panel data proposed by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2002). 9 Table 1 , part I, shows the results. While the evidence is against stationarity when we use the sample from 1960 till 2002 (Sample A, from now on), it is in favor of stationarity if we consider data from 1975 onwards (Sample B). This holds for all variables except for the two variables that measure the stock of public debt as a share of GDP, GDEBT 1 and GDEBT 2. In fact, the test result does not allow us the reject the null hypothesis that GDEBT 1 is I(1) in both samples, but it suggests that GDEBT 2 is a stationary variable in Sample A and Sample B. This mixed evidence on the order of integration of the series may well be due to the presence of structural breaks in the data around the oil-shock and to the inability of the test used to distinguish it from the presence of a unit-root. For this reason, we prefer not to choose any of the two types of results and we will estimate our speciÞcations for both samples, using, in each case, the appropriate econometric technique.
For Sample A, we also test whether the nominal interest rate on 10-year government bonds, the nominal interest rate on 3-month Treasury bills, the inßation rate, the primary deÞcit to GDP ratio, and the public debt to GDP ratio, as measured by GDEBT 1, are cointegrated using the tests suggested by Pedroni (1999) on the panel. The evidence allows us to reject the null hypothesis that the variables are not cointegrated (see Table 1 , part II).
Hence, based on the results shown in Table 1 , we estimate our models in levels. We always include country Þxed effects, and linear and quadratic trends or year Þxed effects. When Sample A is used, we estimate the relation among the long-term interest rate, the short-term interest rate, the inßation rate and the Þscal policy variables by dynamic GLS, because OLS standard errors are not valid when variables are cointegrated. More precisely, in models using Sample A, we allow for heterosckedasticity and Þrst order autocorrelation in the error term and include among the regressors the contemporaneous differences of the right-hand side variables. Both the autocorrelation coefficient and the coefficients of the contemporaneous differences of the right-hand side variables are allowed to be country-speciÞc. 10 When we use Sample B, models are estimated by OLS and standard errors are 9 When the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test was applied to data for each country, the results permitted rejection of the presence of a unit root for many, but not all, countries in the sample. The Im, Pesaran, and Shin test is preferred given the low power of the ADF in small samples and the desirability of adopting the same dynamic speciÞcation for the entire panel. 10 In columns 4 and 8 we also add the rate of growth of GDP among the rhs variables. The table shows that there is a positive relationship between the primary deÞcit as a share of GDP and the 10-year government bonds interest rate. Independently of the sample used and the control variables included in the estimation, the coefficient of the primary deÞcit is positive and statistically signiÞcant at the 5% level. The size of the coefficient, however, varies across speciÞcations from 0.136 to 0.074, implying that a one percentage point increase in the primary deÞcit to GDP ratio is associated with an increase of the 10-year government bonds interest rate from a maximum of 13.6 basis points to a minimum of 7.4 basis points.
On the other hand, in all but one speciÞcation ( Table 2 , column 4), we do not Þnd a positive and statistically signiÞcant relationship between long-term interest rates and the stock of public debt as a share of GDP. In one speciÞcation ( Table 2 , column 1) the coefficient of GDEBT 1 is even negative and statistically signiÞcant, suggesting that a one percentage point increase in the stock of public debt as a share of GDP is associated with a decrease of one basis point of the 10-year government bonds interest rate.
Non-linearities
We are not the Þrst ones to Þnd evidence of a negative relation between the stock of public debt and long-term interest rates. Caporale and Williams (2002) interpret a negative coefficient as due to a portfolio effect. When governments issue bonds and investors consider them of high quality, they switch into them from bad quality debt. The price of such bonds goes differences of the right-hand side variables and allow for an AR(1) error term. Results are, however, very similar if one includes also one lag or one lead of the differences of the right-hand side variables among the regressors.
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up and the yield decreases. The opposite occurs when investors believe that governments' bonds are risky and of low quality. What this suggests is that the relation between long-term interest rates and the stock of public debt can be non-linear and depend, for example, on the level of the debt. When the stock of debt is low, Þnancial markets consider it of high quality and an increase in its level is associated with a fall in interest rates. However, when government debt reaches a given threshold, further increases are associated with higher interest rates.
Following this line of argument, we investigate the presence of nonlinearities in Table  3 . Columns 1 and 5 of Table 3 introduce among the regressors of Table 2 the square terms of the primary deÞcit and of the public debt to GDP ratios. We Þnd evidence of non-linearities in the deÞcit in Sample A but not in Sample B. Given that we tend to consider estimates from the latter sample more reliable because all variables included in the regression have the same order of integration, we do not put too much emphasis on this result. 11 On the other hand, we Þnd strong evidence of non-linearity in the public debt in both samples. An increase in the public debt-to-GDP ratio has a negative effect on long-term interest rates if the ratio is below 62.5% for the speciÞcation in column 1 and below 65.4% for the one in column 5. The effect of becomes positive when the debt-to-GDP ratio is above these thresholds values. Using the coefficients in column 1, a one standard deviation increase in the ratio of government debt to GDP (i.e. standard deviation of GDEBT = 0.26) is associated with a decrease of the 10-year government bonds rate by 73 basis points when government debt is at its minimum value in sample (i.e. GDEBT = 0.12) but with an increase by 94 basis points if the government debt is at its maximum value in sample (i.e. GDEBT = 1.41).
Columns 2-4 and 6-8 check for non-linear variants to the simple quadratic term in columns 1 and 5. In particular, the idea is to see whether the relation between long-term interest rates and Þscal variables changes above a threshold level of the Þscal variables. To this end, we deÞne two dummy variables, D1 and D2, equal to one if the primary deÞcitto-GDP ratio and, respectively, the public debt-to-GDP ratio are above their median values in the sample (and equal to zero otherwise). 12 We then interact the dummy variables with the square of the difference between the primary deÞcit and its median value in the sample (P RDEF − P RDEF * ), and the square of the difference between public debt and its median 11 Tests results presented in section 2.1 suggested that all variables included in the speciÞcations using Sample A, except GROWTH, are I(1) and cointegrated. GROWTH is, however, I(0). 12 The median value of the primary deÞcit to GDP ratio is -0.001 in Sample A and 0.001 in Sample B.
The median value of the government debt to GDP ratio is 0.59 in Sample A and 0.61 in Sample B.
7 value in the sample (GDEBT − GDEBT * ). These experiments conÞrm that there is a clear nonlinearity in the size of the debt, while -at least in Sample B -the primary deÞcit continues to enter only linearly. Finally, in columns 3, 4, 7, and 8 we check whether the effect of deÞcits depends on the level of debt and vice-versa. Results suggest that increases of the primary deÞcit to GDP ratio have a bigger and statistically signiÞcant effect (at the 10% level or better) on long-term interest rates when the public debt to GDP ratio is above its median value. Instead, we Þnd evidence that the effect of public debt on interest rates depends on the level of the primary deÞcit in Sample A, but not in Sample B. Table 4 addresses the potential endogeneity between long-term interest rates and the public debt. A shock to the long-term interest rate can inßuence the stock of public debt by increasing interest expenses. 13 Both to address this speciÞc source of endogeneity, and to assuage concerns about additional omitted variables, in this table we estimate the models considering all the regressors as endogenous. For presentation reasons, we also show IV estimates for Sample A, but we focus on estimates for Sample B. In fact, based on the results in Table 1 It therefore seems desirable to examine empirically the hypothesis that an individual country's Þscal variables affects the real interest rate only to the extent that they inßuence "world" aggregate variables. To do this with the existing data set, we use average values across OECD countries of the right-hand side variables as a proxy for "world" variables. An obvious caveat is that the OECD is not, in fact, the world: it omits a sizable part of the world economy which may have substantial aggregate savings. At the same time, OECD aggregates do cover a substantial part of the world economy -and an even larger share of global Þnancial markets.
Instrumental Variables
We construct "world" variables for each regressor and introduce these "world" indices among the rhs variables. In columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 of Table 5 , a "world" variable is equal to the weighted average of the variable across all countries in the sample. Weights are based on shares of real GDP measured in PPP terms. 14 Note that the "world" variables constructed in this way have a common value across all countries in the panel. For this reason, year dummies cannot be included as controls in the empirical speciÞcations in columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 of Table 5 .
We estimate the models of Table 5 , columns 1, 2, 5, and 6, including a common linear and quadratic trend among the regressors. Results are quite interesting. First, contrary to the evidence on short-term real interest rates in Barro and Sala-i-Martin (1990), we Þnd that both "world" Þscal policy variables and an individual country's Þscal variables matter for long-term interest rates. The magnitude of the coefficients of the "world" primary deÞcit and "world" public debt are sizeable. An increase by one percentage point of W P RDEF leads to an increase in the interest rate of 10-year government bonds from a minimum of 28 basis points to a maximum of 66 basis points, and an increase by the same amount of W GDEBT raises interest rates from a minimum of 3 basis points of a maximum of 21 basis points. The coefficients are statistically signiÞcant at conventional critical values. Importantly, however, the size and the signiÞcance of the coefficients of P RDEF , GDEBT , and GDEBT 2 are virtually unchanged from the evidence in the previous tables. Note also that results in Table  5 columns 1, 2, 5, and 6 do not change when we allow the linear and quadratic trend to be country speciÞc. This implies that little if any of the impact of domestic deÞcits estimated in the panel regressions reported earlier is channelled via the world economy. 15 An alternative formulation is to construct a "rest of the world" (ROW) average variables that complement the individual country variables. This permits us to include year Þxed effects among the regressors and check that the evidence presented so far still holds. Results with this formulation are reported in columns 3, 4, 7, and 8. Consistently with our previous results, individual countries' changes in the primary deÞcit to GDP ratio has always a positive and statistically signiÞcant effect on INT 10Y , while the effect of public debt is positive (negative) when public debt is above (below) a given threshold. As for the effect of the "world" policy indicators, the coefficient of the average value of the primary deÞcit 15 We also investigated the existence of structural breaks for euro countries in 1999. In particular, for the Euro-zone economies, one might expect that: (i) indicators of Þscal policy in individual countries inßuence national interest rates before 1999 but not after, (ii) measures of aggregate Þscal policy are the only ones that matter after 1999. To test (i) and (ii), we deÞned a dummy variable P EMU equal to 1 after 1999 for the countries in our panel that adopted the euro (Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands) and equal to zero otherwise. We interacted the variable P EMU with the variables P RDEF , GDEBT 1 or GDEBT 2 and their square and with W P RDEF and W GDEBT . We estimated columns 1 and 5 of Table 5 including these additional variables among the regressors. We also estimated these speciÞcations eliminating the square of the variables. We did not Þnd signiÞcant and robust evidence that suggests the presence of a structural break in the relative importance of national and world Þscal policy variables before and after 1999. However, we also think that our experiment is not conclusive. There are at least two caveats that one has to consider. First, the set of countries of the European Union that potentially could have adopted the euro is different from the one that ended up adopting the euro. Second, 1999 cannot be the right date to identify the break if, for example, Þnancial markets anticipated the adoption of the euro. is no longer signiÞcant, while the one of public debt is still positive and signiÞcant and its value ranges from 0.096 to 0.115. In conclusion, we read the results in Table 5 as evidence in favor of the international Þnancial integration among OECD countries and the possibility that Þscal shocks in one country inßuences interest rates in others. However, it seems that either the degree of integration is far from perfect, or that there is a non-negligible risk that deÞcits are reßected in expected inßation or default risk: changes in the domestic stance of Þscal policy still matter for domestic long-term interest rates beyond their effect on aggregate variables.
Financial Development
In this section we bring into the picture indicators of Þnancial development. The rationale for this extension is twofold. First, Þnancial development obviously potentially affects the level of interest rates, and if it is correlated with Þscal policy it may generate a bias in our coefficients. This suggests that it is worthwhile to include Þnancial development as an additional control. Second, the degree of Þnancial development may affect the responsiveness of interest rates to Þscal shocks. This suggests that it may be interesting to include interactions among the Þscal variables and Þnancial development. The range of Þnancial development in this OECD sample is comparatively limited; but even within this set of developed countries, differences in the Þnancial systems, and in the depth and liquidity of Þnancial markets, can have important effects on the behavior of long-term interest rates.
We add among the regressors the variables used by Levine et al. (2000) to measure Þnancial liberalization. SpeciÞcally, we use the variable LIQUID LIABILIT IES equal to the liquid liabilities of the Þnancial system as a share of GDP, the variable P RIV AT E CREDIT , equal to the value of credits by Þnancial intermediaries to the private sector divided by GDP, and the indicator COMMERCIAL − CENT RAL BANK, equal to the ratio of commercial banks assets divided by commercial bank plus central bank assets. In Table 6 we show the results obtained when we add the Þrst of the three variables. An increase in Þnancial liberalization leads to a decrease in the long-term interest rate and the coefficient of LIQUID LIABILIT IES is statistically signiÞcant at the 5% level. More to the point for our purposes, the effect of changes in the primary deÞcit and public debt to GDP ratio remains virtually unchanged. Results (not shown) are along the same line if we measure Þnancial development with the variables P RIV AT E CREDIT and COMMERCIAL − CENT RAL BANK.
More interesting results are obtained by adding interaction terms between the Þscal variables and Þnancial development. Here, we Þnd that the degree of Þnancial development affects the responsiveness of interest rates to changes in the primary-deÞcit-to GDP ratio: in more developed Þnancial markets, increases in the primary deÞcit-to-GDP ratio attenuate the surge in long-term interest rates.
Alternative left-hand-side variables
We conclude this section by discussing the results we obtain by using a variety of alternative left-hand-side variables.
We have re-estimated the relation between interest rates, the inßation rate, Þscal variables and GDP growth using real rather than nominal interest rates. Ideally, one would like to measure the long term real interest rate as the difference between the 10-year nominal interest rate and expectations of inßation of the next ten years. Inßation's forecasts over such a long-term time period are not available for our panel of countries. We follow Orr et al. (1995) in proxying long-term inßation expectations by trend inßation. 16 Our results (shown in Table 7 ) are almost unchanged relatively to the ones in the speciÞcations using nominal interest rates.
Second, we use as the dependent variable the nominal yield spread of 10-year government bonds over 3-month Treasury bills. Once again, as Table 8 shows, our conclusions on the effect of Þscal policy on long-term interest rates are unaffected by this speciÞcation change. Third, we use as our left-hand side variable the long-term interest rate series published by the OECD, which is an average of the interest rates paid on long-term government bonds. Fourth, we look at the spread between domestic 10 year interest rates and German 10 year interest rates. Again results (not shown but available upon request) still hold. One popular left-hand-side variable in studies of the effect of Þscal variables is the yield spread of 10-year government bonds over swap contracts with the same maturity and currency denomination. 17 The rationale for this choice of dependent variable is that it measures the 16 We compute trend inßation using the Hodrick-Prescott Þlter. We apply the Þlter to each country inßation rate using quarterly data and a value of λ equal to 1600. We then take the average over each year of the trend inßation generated with quarterly data and calculate the 10-year real interest rate at a yearly frequency by subtracting the average of trend inßation to the nominal interest rate. We also start with quarterly data to compute the real 3-month interest rate as the difference between the nominal interest rate of 3-month Treasury bills and the ex-post inßation rate. We then average over the year the quarterly data. 17 Swap contracts are agreements to exchange a ßow of interest rates payments at a Þxed rate for one at government's default risk. In Table 9 , we show that Þscal policy also affects the 10-year interest rate on swap contracts, which implies that Þscal policy shocks affect interest rates also on instruments not issued by the government. In fact, if we use as our left-hand side variable the spread of the 10-year government bond interest rate over the swap interest rate we Þnd that the coefficients of P RDEF and GDEBT are not statistically signiÞcant. These results may suggest that the impact of Þscal policy on interest rates is not likely to be via default risk directly, but could be through expected inßation (which can also be triggered by an increase in sovereign default risk), or through the demand for loanable funds, both of which would be expected to affect the swap market in a similar way to the long-term bond market. 18 
Dynamic Estimates
So far, our analysis has not allowed for the fact that Þnancial markets are forward-looking and, hence, react not only to Þscal shocks in the current period, but also to the expectation of future Þscal policy. Moreover, coefficients in tables shown so far do not capture the full impact of changes in Þscal policy on long-term interest rates, because we have not accounted for the effects that Þscal variables have on long-term rates through their potential inßuence on the short-term rate, the inßation rate and the rate of growth of GDP.
In this section, we attempt to address these issues by estimating a vector autoregressive system including the 10-year government bonds interest rate, the 3-month Treasury bills interest rate, the inßation rate, the rate of growth of GDP, the primary deÞcit-to-GDP ratio and the public debt-to-GDP ratio. We set the lag length of the system to 2 and, following Alesina et al. (2002) , we estimate the VAR on the entire panel. 19 We then study the impulse response function of the long-term interest rate to a shock to the primary deÞcit or public debt at the time of the shock and in the following years. 20 a ßoating rate. For papers that use the interest rate of swap contracts to measure governments' default risk see, for example, Afonso Lemmen and Goodhart (1999) . 18 Data on swap contracts are not available before 1988 for countries in our sample. For this reason, we present only estimates with Sample B in Table 9 . 19 To estimate the VAR, we demean the data from country and year averages to control for country and time Þxed effects. 20 Gale and Orszag (2002) note that studies that do not take expectations into account are biased toward Þnding no effect because they do not account for the fact the Þnancial markets are forward-looking. Also,
In order to obtain meaningful impulse responses of the long-term rate to the Þscal shock, we need innovations that are mutually orthogonal. The reduced form innovations are clearly correlated with each other and a shock to the primary deÞcit (public debt) is not really a shock to this variable but a linear combination of its structural shock and shocks of the other variables included in the system. To identify the structural primary deÞcit and public debt shocks, we use the Cholesky decomposition, and we orthogonalize the innovations in several ways to check that our results are not unduly sensitive to the order with which we choose variables to enter the system.
We consider two extreme cases. First, we assume that Þscal policy variables "come Þrst", followed by the inßation rate, the rate of growth of GDP, the 3-month Treasury bills interest rate and the 10-year government bonds interest rate ( Table 10 , parts Ia and Ib). Second, we consider the case in which INT 3M is ordered Þrst, followed by INF L, GROW T H, P RDEF , GDEBT , and INT 10Y ( Table 10 , parts IIa and IIb). Within each case, we consider both the sub-case with the primary deÞcit "coming before" public debt (Table 10 parts Ia and IIa) and the sub-case with public debt "coming before" the primary deÞcit (Table 10 parts Ib and IIb). We also checked (and conÞrm) that results are similar to the ones in Table 10 when we exchange the order of INF L and GROW T H. 21 Table 10 displays the changes in the 10-year government bond interest rate following a shock to the primary deÞcit and public debt by one percentage point, on impact and up to ten years, and the cumulative change after the Þrst Þve and ten years.
A positive shock to the ratio of primary deÞcit to GDP leads to an increase in INT 10Y of 7 basis points on impact, and to a cumulative increase of 66 and 146 basis points after Þve works based on time series evidence from the US that measures expectations through a vector autoregression tend to Þnd smaller and less robust effects than studies that include measures of forecasted Þscal variables from the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) or the Office of Management and Budget (OMB). While forecasts from a VAR are based only on past information on variables of the system, forecasts from the CBO or the OMB also use other information as, for example, information on proposed changes in tax and spending legislation.
To the best of our knowledge, long-horizon forecasts of future Þscal policy variables are not available for our large panels. Renhart and Sack (2000) use the budget surplus forecasted for the following year by the OECD from 1981 onwards. But we Þnd no study using panel data on OECD countries that includes 5-year ahead and/or 10-year ahead projections of the deÞcit and the public debt. Hence, we cannot follow the literature on the US (see for example Canzoneri, Cumby and Diba (2002) , and Laubach (2003)) and we can only account for expectations estimating a VAR system. 21 The use of yearly data prevents us from adopting the identiÞcation assumptions in Blanchard and Perotti (2002) , and Perotti (2002) . and ten years, respectively (see Part I of Table 10 ). The impact effect is very similar to the one we obtain in the static models, but since the effect persists over time, the cumulative response of the long-term interest rate after Þve and ten years is quite sizeable. This provides evidence in line with Feldstein (1986) who emphasizes the importance of considering expectations about the stance of future Þscal policy in measuring the effect of the government deÞcit on interest rates. The coefficients are statistically signiÞcant at the 5% level. Increases in public debt, in general, lead to lower interest rates on impact and in a few years after the shock occurs. However, the effect becomes positive as time goes by and the cumulative response ten years after the shock is often positive and statistically signiÞcant. In line with the results from the static models, the magnitude of the effects is smaller than the one due to a change in the primary deÞcit. Finally, note that, while the response of INT 10Y to a shock to the primary deÞcit is not unduly sensitive to the orthogonalization procedure, the coefficients of GDEBT are quite different in size according to the strategy used to identify the structural shocks. This consideration calls for considerable caution in interpreting these dynamic results.
Conclusions
This paper has used cross-country empirical analysis to establish that Þscal deÞcits and the accumulated public debt affect interest rates. The effects are both statistically and economically signiÞcant, and they are robust to a variety of speciÞcations. These effects are non-linear, becoming stronger as a country's debt grows and its Þscal balance becomes weaker. The dynamic analysis presented also shows that the long-run effects of sustained deÞcits are much larger than the immediate impact of a one-time deÞcit. These results imply that the return to Þscal laxity that has taken place in several major industrial countries in recent years is potentially worrisome.
Fiscal policy has important effects at the worldwide level, but it also has important effects at the level of the individual country. These results suggest that, while each country's Þscal imbalance has its greatest impact at home, it is also a legitimate concern at the level of the world economy. 
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